The Tunnel provides a trade-off between protection and convenience. In general, the more protection the less convenience, and vice versa. There are several parameters that control this trade-off.
The Tunnel can be used either, (a) to "open" environments that are currently closed (behind traditional firewalls) or, conversely, (b) to add protection for environments that are currently completely open. If this is done, users in (a) would most likely enjoy the more open environment, whereas users in (b) would suffer from the inconvenience imposed, without necessarily appreciating the added protection. In this case, education and training may be required to make (b) acceptable to the users. Figure 1 illustrates the relative position of the Tunnel in comparison with other common protection approaches. An organization in charge of national security might not want to connect their private network with the outside at world at all. An open environment, such as a university, might find the Tunnel to be too restrictive. There are many organizations, both in the government and in industry that have elected to hide behind a firewall that provides some protection, at the cost of great inconvenience. The purpose of the Tunnel is to provide a level of protection similar to the level provided by a traditional firewall, with greater convenience and flexibility. 
Access Privileges
A visa allowing two hosts to communicate with each other may be created only if there is an entry in the access-table allowing it. Access-table entries are typically set up when the Tunnel is booted, however they may also be added and deleted by the System Administrator, using the "tunnel_access" utility.
The access-table is a set of {from, to} pairs where each of the "from" and the "to" specifies a network, a subnet, or a single host, by specifying an IP-address and a mask, for a total of 2x(32+32) bits for each such pair of (address + mask).
Host-A is allowed to communicate with Host-B through implicit visa creation only if the access-table has an entry {from, to} such that Host-A matches the "from", and Host-B matches the "to".
However, for explicit visa creation, the requirements are less stringent. For example, between Host-A and Host-B, explicit visa creation is allowed when the access-table has an entry for the host-pair, e.g., {A,B} or {B,A}.
Visa Creation
The Tunnel allows communication between an internal and an external host if, and only if, there is a valid visa for that host-pair, and for that transport-level protocol type.
There are two ways to create visas, implicitly or explicitly.
Visas are created implicitly, automatically, for a host-pair when an internal host starts communicating with any external host, provided that there are access privileges for that pair, as described above in 2.1. This allows for smooth, transparent, IP-based communication provided that it is initiated by an internal host.
Visas are created explicitly by authorized users. Examples are as follows:
(1) Authorized users who happen to be outside (e.g., local personnel on travel, using an external host) log into the Tunnel and use the "create_visa" utility to create a visa for the external host and a specified inside host.
(2) The system administrator (logged in as root) may use the "tunnel_visa" utility to create a visa for a pair of hosts. Visas may also be created as a part of the Tunnel boot sequence.
No communication through the Tunnel may be initiated from the outside without a visa that was explicitly created for it.
The protocol type of a visa may be defined when the visa is explicitly created. The protocols recognized by name are as follows : ICMP, IGMP, GGP, EIP, ST, TCP, UCL, EGP, IGP, PUP, UDP, IDP, HELLO, ND. It is also possible to specify a protocol number for a protocol that is not listed. If the default protocol, ANY, is specified, the protocol field in the visa will be filled in from the protocol field in the IP header of the first packet that is matched with the visa. ALL, the wildcard-protocol value, matches all values of the protocol field in an IP header and may be specified, provided that the user creating the visa is logged in on the Tunnel as "root".
Implementation Issues
An original goal of the Tunnel was to have communication that was initiated on the inside be transparent. However, we discovered that keepalives coming from the inside may keep a visa going indefinitely in the event that a user does not properly terminate an application. Therefore, a maximum lifetime DT_life was implemented to ensure that there was a limit on how long a visa's lifetime could be extended by keepalives.
An additional problem surfaced; if the Tunnel expunged visas that had outlived DT_life, keepalive packets from the inside would cause a new visa to be created. To prevent the creation of a new visa caused by persistent keepalives from the inside, we decided to invert the role of the visa in this case. Namely, when a visa outlives DT_life, or the visa is explicitly deleted, its role will be to prevent access, rather than to grant access. To accomplish this we mark the visa "out of service" and employ a waiting period (DT_wait) before the visa is expunged from the system. Between the time that a visa exceeds DT_life or is deleted (T_exp), and the time that it can be expunged (T_exp + DT_wait), the visa remains "out of service". During this period, each time a packet arrives from the inside, the packet is discarded and T_exp, the expiration time, is updated, effectively delaying the expunge time.
Unfortunately, however, the Tunnel software is unable to tell the difference between legitimate traffic and keepalives. Therefore the keepalive avoidance logic has two sideeffects that can potentially cause inconvenience for the user.
(1) Many users are in the habit of leaving an application, e.g., a mail tool, running for extended periods of time. The keepalive avoidance logic blocks communication after the application has been running for a period of DT_life.
(2) Some transaction based applications run for a short time, but are run very often. If such an application is run more often than every DT_wait, communication will be blocked after the application has been repeated over a period of DT_life.
The solution for both of these problems is that the user must explicitly create a visa every DT_life time period, whether the user is on the inside or the outside. Practice (1) is incompatible with "life in a closed environment." Both practices (1) and (2) result in "holes in the fence" that are convenient to use, but their duration should be minimized to reduce the risk.
Another goal of the Tunnel is to guard against the situation in which a person using an outside host leaves his workstation for an extended period of time, and the workstation is used by an unauthorized person. To counteract this problem, we implemented an activity timeout DT_act that blocks communication after a period of inactivity. The expiration time (T_exp) is set to the current time plus the activity timeout (T_now + DT_act).
Therefore, if a packet is received from the outside after T_exp, the visa is considered to be expired. Packets received from the outside when the visa is expired are discarded. Packets from the inside, which would result in the creation of a new visa if no visa existed, are forwarded and renew the visa by resetting T_exp to (T_now + DT_act). Hence, DT_act effects only traffic from the outside.
The protection against unattended workstations may cause a problem for users on the outside who need more time than DT_act to exit their session on the Tunnel and to get their application started, after creating a visa. To solve this problem. we allow an initial timeout (DT_init), which can be set to a value larger than DT_act if so desired. Before a visa is used for the first time T_exp is set to (T_create + DT_init), giving the user extra time to exit his Telnet session on the Tunnel and start his application.
The DT_act still has the potential for causing inconvenience to users on the outside. Therefore, it is important that this parameter be adjusted with the particular application and/or the communication patterns of the particular user in mind. Again, longer is more convenient; shorter is more secure.
Visa Renewal and Expiration
A visa is marked "in service" when it is created. A visa is marked "out of service" when it is deleted explicitly, or when it expires because its maximum lifetime of the visa has been exceeded. A visa is not marked "out of service" when it expires because of inactivity.
A visa expires when the current time (T_now) is after the expiration time (T_exp). T_exp is set as follows:
• If the visa is created at the time T_create, the initial value of T_exp is (T_create + DT_init). It is assumed that DT_init is less than DT_life.
• While a visa is not expired (T_now < T_exp), each time a packet arrives T_exp is set to the minimum of (T_now + DT_act) and (T_create + DT_life).
• When a visa is expired because of inactivity, i.e., is still "in service", a packet from the outside network will be rejected and will have no effect. However, if a packet from the inside network arrives, T_exp is set to the minimum of (T_now + DT_act) and (T_create + DT_life), as before. See the examples in Figure 3 and Figure 4 .
• When a visa is expired and "out of service", a packet from the outside will be rejected and will have no effect. However, if a packet from the inside arrives, T_exp is set to T_now. This effectively delays the expunge time each time a keepalive arrives. See the example in Figure 5 .
Once a visa has expired or been deleted, it will not be expunged from the system until a period of DT_wait has elapsed (when T_now = T_exp + DT_wait). During this waiting period, for visas that are marked "out of service", packets originating from the inside network will not cause automatic visa renewal to take place, but will instead delay the expunge time. Once the "out of service" visa has been expunged, the visa will be automatically re-created when a packet from the inside is received. Alternatively, an authorized user can put the visa "back in service" by logging on to the Tunnel system and explicitly re-creating it.
DT_wait, the period of time that must elapse before an expired visa is expunged from the system, is a system-wide constant. To change it, the Tunnel system must be re-built. DT_wait should be longer than the interval associated with any keepalive mechanism that is in use on the inside network.
Stated another way, visas expire under the following conditions:
• Implicitly, by not being used for DT_act time (or DT_init, initially)
• Implicitly, at DT_life after the visa's creation.
• Explicitly, when a utility program (delete_visa or tunnel_visa) is used to delete a specific visa or a set of visas.
Visas are expunged from the system in any of the following conditions:
• DT_wait after expiration.
• Visa has expired or has been explicitly deleted and it contains a wildcard-host and/or a wildcard-protocol (ALL) specification.
• Visa has expired or has been explicitly deleted and it contains a default protocol specification (ANY), and thus has never been used. Figure 3 illustrates the expiration of a visa that has exceeded its maximum lifetime, DT_life. In this example the visa was created at (I), or T_create, and the visa was no longer valid at (M) = (T_create + DT_life).
FIGURE 3. Visa expires due to exceeding its max-life
The initial expiration time is (i) = (T_create + DT_init).
Before (i), the visa is used at time (A), and extended to (a); before (a), the visa is used at the time (B), and extended to (b); before (b), the visa is used at the time (C), and extended to (c);
before (c), the visa is used at the time (D), and extended to (d);
before (d), the visa is used at the time (E), and extended to (e).
Since (e) > (M), i.e., beyond the maximum allowed life, the visa expires at (M), and marked as being out-of-service, until it is expunged at (X) = (M) + DT_wait.
Visa is created.
Marked OOS
DT_act
Figure 4 illustrates how a visa expires due to inactivity. In this example a visa is created at (I) or T_create, and is no longer valid at (M) = (T_create + DT_life).
FIGURE 4. Visa expires due to lack of activity
Before (i), the visa is used at time (A), and extended to (a);
before (a), the visa is used at the time (B), and extended to (b); before (b), the visa is used at the time (C), and extended to (c).
However,the visa is not used by the time (c) and therefore it expires then, without being marked as being out-of-service. It is expunged at the time (X) = (c) + DT_wait.
Maximum life Figure 5 illustrates how keepalives from the inside are handled. In this example, a visa is created at (I), or T_create, and is no longer valid at (M) = (T_create + DT_life). After the visa expires, it is marked "out of service", because it was in use beyond time (M). After that, as keepalives are received from the inside, the expiration time, or T_exp is updated, delaying the time when the visa can be expunged.
FIGURE 5. Visa expires due to exceeding its max-life, fighting inside-keepalives.
Before (i), the visa is used at time (A), and extended to (a); before (a), the visa is used at the time (B), and extended to (b); before (b), the visa is used at the time (C), and extended to (c).
Since (c) > (M), i.e., that time is beyond the maximum allowed life, the visa expires at (M), and is marked as being out-of-service.
At this point the visa is scheduled to be expunged at (h) = (M) + DT_wait, however after a packet from the inside is received at time P, the packet is discarded and the time for the visa to be expunged is extended to (p); after a packet from the inside is received at time Q, the packet is discarded, and the time for the visa to be expunged is extended to (q); after a packet from the inside is received at time R, the packet is discarded, and the time for the visa to be expunged is extended to (r).
Since no more packets were received between (q) and (r), the visa is expunged at time (r).
The packets P, Q, and R were discarded by the Tunnel.
Defaults
The following are the defaults for the parameters used to configure the Tunnel system: 
Additional Features

ICMP Messages
The system administrator can set the Tunnel to not generate ICMP messages in order to reduce the Tunnel's visibility. Alternatively, the Tunnel can be set to generate "ICMP Host Unreachable" messages when an external host attempts to communicate without a visa, with an internal host.
All such occurrences are recorded by the Tunnel, and the total number of packets rejected for each host pair is reported periodically.
Source Routing
Source routing of IP packets could potentially be used by someone on the outside to open visas from the inside. This might occur in two possible ways, depending on which addresses in the packet are deemed to be the source and the destination addresses to be matched with the addresses in a visa.
(1) If the Tunnel compares the IP-source-address and the IP-destination-address against the addresses in the visa, there is the risk that an unauthorized person might insert the addresses used in a legitimate visa into the middle of a communication between two hosts for which no visa exists. For example if a visa exists for Host-I and Host-X, the source route "Host-A -> Host-X -> Host-I" would allow communication between outside Host-A and inside Host-I, using that visa. 
(2) If the Tunnel compares the first and last hosts listed in the source route against the addresses in the visa, an unauthorized person might fake the first address at the beginning of the source route. For example, if a visa exists for Host-I and Host-X, the source route "Host-X -> Host-A -> Host-I" would allow communication between outside Host-A and inside Host-I, using that visa.
FIGURE 6. Problems potentially caused by source routing.
Therefore, because it is impossible for the Tunnel to determine which two hosts in a source route are actually communicating, the Tunnel drops all source-routed packets.
Port Filtering
A visa specifies a host pair and the transport level protocol for which the visa may be used (such as TCP, UDP, and ICMP). It is possible to statically configure the Tunnel to disallow the use of certain ports of certain protocols, for example Telnet (TCP #23).
We could have used a "good-ports" table or a "bad-ports" table. If only a few specific ports are to be allowed, it is more efficient to list the "good-ports". However, since the Tunnel was designed with the assumption that very few types of communication were to be disallowed, we chose to list "bad-ports" explicitly. Listing "good-ports" is particularly difficult when applications that use multiple connections, such as FTP, are to be supported, since the ports that are to be used for the various connections may not be known in advance.
The port-table in the tunnel program, "tunnel.c", is compiled into the system. The tunnel program is currently able to filter ports defined for TCP. This limited port filtering capability may be expanded so that the list of ports that are prohibited can be dynamically configured by the System Administrator in a future version of the Tunnel. 
Tunnel Logging Facility
The Tunnel uses the standard Sun "syslogd" mechanism to log messages. See the section "TUNNEL CONTROL FILE" in Appendix B for details of how this is set up. The Tunnel logs the following events:
• Program errors.
• Table overflow (visa and access-table entry not created).
• access-table entry creation/deletion.
• Each time that the Tunnel defaults are set.
• Visa creation/deletion/expiration/expunge.
• Visa creation attempts rejected because no entry in the access-table exists.
• Count of packets rejected since previous report per [reason, src-addr, dst-addr, protocol] .
• Count of packets forwarded and/or "out of service" per visa.
To change the set of events that is logged, the Tunnel must be rebuilt. In a future version of the Tunnel, logging may be dynamically configured by the System Administrator.
Permanent Visas
Warning: A permanent visa is a hole in the fence and is therefore a serious access control risk. We highly recommend that permanent visas not be allowed when access control is important.
To facilitate long term, machine-initiated interactions, a permanent visa may be created by the system administrator, logged in as "root". This approach may be used to set up a permanent communication path between a specific host on the inside and a specific host on the outside, for example two servers. Permanent visas should be used with extreme caution, since they create an opening that could potentially be taken advantage of by an attacker.
The following is the policy with regard to permanent visas that is implemented in the Tunnel:
• Only root may create a permanent visa.
• A permanent visa contains no expiration date and can be marked "out of service" only as the result of a system call.
• Only root may delete or modify a permanent visa, and must do an explicit deletion, specifying both hosts.
When a fully specified permanent visa is deleted, it is marked "NOT permanent" and "out of service", and is given an expiration time. In effect, it becomes a normal visa waiting for the DT_wait period to be expunged. This is to avoid keepalives in the same manner that they are avoided when any other visa is deleted.
Wildcard Visas
Warning: A wildcard visa is a hole in the fence and is therefore a serious access control risk. We highly recommend that wildcard visas not be allowed when access control is important.
To facilitate network monitoring applications, it is possible to set up a permanent visa in which either host (or both hosts) is a "wildcard" value (0.0.0.0). Wildcard visas should be used with extreme caution, since they could potentially create an opening that could be taken advantage of by an attacker.
The visa [*, *, *] totally bypasses the Tunnel for all packets.
A visa that contains a wildcard-host specification or a wildcard-port specification is expunged as soon as it expires or is explicitly deleted. This is necessary because it might otherwise block the creation of visas that should legitimately be "implicitly" created, if the system attempted to do "keepalive avoidance" processing on a visa that contained wildcard parameters.
Risk Analysis
The addition of the Tunnel to sites currently behind traditional firewalls will make the interactions with the outside smoother, with little added risk.
Replacing a conventional router with a Tunnel (e.g., at ISI) would significantly reduce the risks of the interactions with the outside. However, this added protection may cause inconvenience.
Some of the risks of using the Tunnel are identical to the risks of using any shared system. It is possible to break into a firewall and attack internal systems by:
(a) Stealing the password to the firewall. Since passwords are typically sent in the clear, often over an Ethernet, this is relatively easy.
(b) The use of other attack techniques such as address spoofing, nameserver spoofing, or the exploitation of bugs in software running on the firewall.
A risk that is specific to the Tunnel is the use of a valid visa that was created by an authorized user, but used by an unauthorized user. This can take place under the following conditions:
(c) The unauthorized user uses an external computer at the same time that an authorized user (located either inside or outside) is using it. On multi-user systems (like Sun workstations and servers), at the same time that a legitimate session takes place, another job can be started in parallel.
(d) The unauthorized user uses an external system after the authorized user (located either inside or outside) has concluded his use. For example, an inside host may send "keepalives" on a connection that has not been closed properly, thus improperly causing visas to be regenerated in the Tunnel.
The most serious threat is (a), the communication of a password in the clear, especially over LANs, like those in most of the sites visited by authorized users, especially those users who are anxious to read their e-mail. This risk applies equally to communication with the current firewalls and the Tunnel. Password theft may be accomplished easily using any of the many popular "protocol analyzers". This may be done practically anywhere on the Internet, and especially in LAN-based sites. Some of the methods to reduce this risk are: (1) One-time passwords (requiring the traveling authorized users to carry a list of one-time passwords), (2) using a challenge/response or time-based scheme, requiring the traveling authorized user to carry an hand-held credit card size "calculator", or (3) providing end-to-end authentication (e.g., by Kerberos). There are several variations on the above such as the use of a personal notebook computer or a password controlled software to generate the response for the challenge in (2).
We recommend the implementation of some password protection means, for both the "firewall" (independently of the Tunnel) and the Tunnel.
The second risk, (b), of breaking into the Tunnel is practically the same as breaking into the current firewalls. Hence, the risks of (a) and (b) are the same as those that already exist. The Tunnel does not provide any added protection against these threats.
Another attack possibility, (c), is for an external attacker to log into the same system as the one being by used an authorized user, and to use an existing visa for the attack. However, the attacker is limited to the use of the same protocol used by the authorized user. If the protocol in use is TCP, this limitation does not provide much protection. Configuring the Tunnel to disallow packets destined for certain ports can reduce this risk. To protect against this kind of attack, authorized users should be advised to minimize the use of external multi-user systems, and/or to watch (via "who" on UNIX, for example) other users of the same external system. In addition, users should explicitly delete visas that are no longer in use, by using the delete_visa utility.
To counter the risk (d), an attack through a visa left by improper termination of a session, users should always be sure to exit an FTP session, for example, properly. Users should run delete_visa on the Tunnel after access to an internal system is completed. If the workstation being used by the authorized user crashes, the user may use another workstation to log into the Tunnel and to delete all the visas that exist for the inside and/or outside workstation(s) he was using.
A short DT_act protects against (d), but is painful for authorized users on the outside. A waiting period, DT_wait, is used to counter the problem of visa renewal and implicit recreation caused by keepalives originating from hosts on the inside network (d). However, since the Tunnel cannot differentiate between keepalives and legitimate traffic originating on the inside, DT_wait also prevents deleted and expired visas from being automatically revived in the manner that they are automatically created. A short DT_life provides protection against (d), however it may be inconvenient for users on the inside, as well as on the outside, since visas must be periodically renewed.
Packets containing IP-level source routing do not constitute a risk, as all source-routed packets are dropped by the Tunnel.
The above risks should be understood by all users, as well as the proper procedures to counter them.
Software Architecture
The Tunnel software is implemented as a part of the IP protocol layer in the Sun kernel. The defaults in the Sun OS are set up in such a way that the Tunnel will serve as a router, performing IP-level forwarding between networks or subnetworks whenever there is more than one interface attached to it. At the point in the IP processing where it is determined that a particular IP packet is not destined for the local host and that the packet can be sent out on one of the host's interfaces, the Tunnel software is invoked. The Tunnel processing determines whether the packet should be dropped or forwarded, depending on the results of a comparison with the various access control structures and parameters that are part of the Tunnel software. 
Experience
We tested the Tunnel System at ISI. The Tunnel was logically positioned in place of the Cisco router that normally connects the Ethernet subnet used by our division with the rest of ISI and the world.
The Tunnel was designed to open up a closed environment, however in doing the testing at ISI, we were closing a very open environment. Table-2 summarizes the differences between the ISI environment and the environment that the Tunnel was designed for. Figure 9 illustrates the network configuration that existed in the ISI environment. ...
Tunnel
In the ISI testing, a number of adjustments had to be made to allow some network functions to continue (a) without visas being explicitly created, and (b) over a longer time period than a normal visa is permitted to exist, DT_life. The addition of permanent visas and wildcard visas was, in effect, the same as deliberately making "holes" in the Tunnel, to allow certain classes of packets through the Tunnel. Some adjustments were made as follows:
•Permanent visas were added to support applications on inside workstations that make use of outside servers. A broader problem is that users are often not aware of interactions that take place between their workstations and outside servers. Some examples of this at ISI are network file servers, the "phoneserver", and various printers. When files are printed, the user may type "lpr myfile.txt" and thus start up an interaction between his local workstation and an outside host that he's never heard of, much less thought to create a visa for.
•Permanent visas were added to support outside workstations that make use of a fileserver that was located on the inside.
•Wildcard visas were required to support network monitoring applications.
•Wildcard visas were added to support encapsulated-IP multicast tunneling between the Internet and DARTnet.
In addition, several static routes had to be installed on the Tunnel. At the start of the testing we experienced a number of routing problems, partially because of difficulty in adapting the manual configuration, and partially because of errors in the configuration, such as hosts that were set up with an incorrect subnet mask. There were a number of outside hosts that erroneously directed packets addressed to other outside hosts, to the Cisco router. The Cisco router had previously forwarded the packets. The Tunnel, which was deliberately set up to forward only between the inside subnet and outside, did not forward them. Routing tables on the offending hosts had to be individually corrected. A "domino effect" resulted in some routing instability that lasted for the next few hours.
None of the problems at ISI that required these fixes exist at sites that are now behind firewalls! It is our assessment that if an environment is supposed to be closed for protection against attacks, the use of permanent visas and visas that contain wildcard-host specifications should be minimized, or ideally, eliminated. Every permanent visa is a hole in the fence around the protected "inside".
Similarly mailers and domain name servers should not be inside the fence because they create traffic which creates visas that may be exploited by attackers.
Comparison
The Tunnel provides an alternative to a traditional firewall that contains a fixed access list. When a fixed access list is used, all interactions between specific hosts, or between classes of hosts defined by an address and a mask, must be anticipated. On the Tunnel, an interaction initiated by a host on the inside sets up access for packets to be sent in the opposite direction. Therefore, it is not necessary that a system administrator be specifically concerned with the identification of participants in network communication.
Since the Tunnel is implemented on a Sun workstation, it is potentially vulnerable to any break in techniques that can be applied to a Sun. Users log in directly on the Tunnel, in order to set up access from the outside. Firewalls that are based on a fixed access list avoid some of the risks associated with workstation-based firewalls, such as the Tunnel. In addition, firewalls that are based on a more secure system architecture may prove to be more resistant to various attacks.
The Tunnel allows greater flexibility than an application level gateway, which has to be reprogrammed each time an application is added. Whether the support of a new application is seen as an advantage or a disadvantage, depends upon one's point of view.
Since new applications can contain bugs and can introduce security vulnerabilities, an application level gateway can also be viewed as protection from new, untested technology. However, in an environment where convenience and the use of the latest software tools is considered to be of high importance, use of the Tunnel provides access to all IP-based communications.
Conclusion
The Tunnel was implemented at ISI as a small scale project. We believe that it has good potential for providing increased convenience with very little increased risk, in a variety of environments. The Tunnel can be configured to serve as a router for an open environment, such as a university, or for an organization concerned with reducing its vulnerability to attacks.
Proposed extensions include:
• One-time passwords,
• Additional dynamic configuration capability,
• On-line alerts on certain conditions, and
• Negative access (black lists).
are the defaults that the Tunnel is already initialized with, however other values may be specified:
/etc/tunnel_defaults i 600 I 600 a 600 A 3600 l 14400 u TRUE
The syslog file (path, and recording parameters): On the Tunnel machine, add the following line to the end of the file "/etc/syslog.conf":
local7.info@log_machine
where "log_machine" is the host name of the machine on which the log messages will be collected.
On the log machine, add the following line to the end of the file "/etc/syslog.conf":
local7.info /var/log/syslog.tunnel Log messages will be written into the file "/var/log/syslog.tunnel" on "log_machine".
The parameter that controls which events are logged is a constant that is compiled into the Tunnel kernel. "LOG_DEFAULT" is currently defined such that everything will be logged. Individual flags are defined as follows:
• LOG_ERROR: Program errors
• LOG_NO_ACCESS : Visa creation attempts rejected because no access-table entry exists.
• LOG_NO_SPACE: No space (visa and access-table entry creation failed).
• LOG_VISA: Visa creation/deletion/expiration/expunge.
• LOG_ACCESS: access-table entry creation/deletion.
• LOG_DEFAULTS : Each time that the Tunnel defaults are set.
• LOG_BAD_P_CNT : Count of packets rejected since previous report per [reason, src_addr, dst_addr, protocol] .
• LOG_FWD_P_CNT: Count of packets forwarded and/or "out of service" per visa.
NAME create_visa -Create a visa on the Tunnel System.
DESCRIPTION
create_visa is used to create a visa for communication between the host from which the user has telnet'd (or rlogin'd) to the Tunnel, and another host specified by the user, on the other side of the Tunnel.
The following is an example of how to create a visa for outside host "enclyclopaedia.britanica.edu" and inside host "myhost.isi.edu" , while telnet'd to the Tunnel, from "enclyclopaedia.britanica. •"delete_visa" deletes all visas in which local host is involved.
•"delete_visa Host1" deletes all visas in which Host1 is involved, and deletes all visas in which local host is involved.
•"delete_visa Host1 ALL" deletes all visas in which Host1 is involved.
•"delete_visa Host1 Host2 " deletes all visas in which both Host1 and Host2 are involved.
This will allow the administrator to delete a specific visa or a class of visas. It will also allow a user to delete his visas from another host following a crash of a system that he was using.
One drawback is that it will be possible for anyone who has access on the Tunnel machine to delete other people's visas, however we believe that it is important for users to be able to remove visas in the event of a crash, rather than having them depend on the system administrator.
The following is an example of its use deleting any visas in existence for hosts "enclyclopaedia.britanica.edu" and "myhost.isi.edu", while telnet'd to the Tunnel, from "enclycolpaedia.britanica.edu": (All times "t" are in seconds.) DESCRIPTION tunnel_defaults may be used by the system administrator, logged in as "root", to change the Tunnel system defaults. The Tunnel is configured with minimum and maximum values for each of these parameters, so if a value that is out of the acceptable range is entered, tunnel_defaults will use the closest possible legal value instead.
If no options are supplied on the command line, tunnel_defaults lists the current values.
OPTIONS -i DT_init
Default time limit for first use. Initially 600, maximum 3600, minimum 30.
-I DT_init_max
Maximum time limit for first use. Initially 600, maximum 3600, minimum 30.
-a DT_act
Default time limit after last use. Initially 600, maximum 3600, minimum 1.
-A DT_act_max
Maximum time limit after last use. Initially 600, maximum 3600, minimum 1.
-l DT_life
Maximum lifetime of a visa. Initially 14400, maximum 14400, minimum 1. The default protocol, ANY, signifies that the protocol field in the visa will be filled in from the protocol field in the IP header of the first packet that is matched with this visa. A protocol number may also be supplied.
The wildcard-protocol value, ALL, will match any value in the protocol field in the IP header of a packet. The user must be logged in as "root" for ALL to be accepted as a legal port value.
OPTIONS -a To add visa(s):
tunnel_visa -a host1 host2 [protocol [setup_time_limit [usage_time_limit] ]]
-p To add permanent visa(s):
tunnel_visa -p host1 host2 protocol
For both a permanent visa and a visa in which the wildcard-host, ALL, appears, the user must be logged in as "root", and a specific protocol or ALL (not ANY) must be provided.
-d To delete visa(s): tunnel_visa -d host1 [host2]
When "host2" is omitted, all visas that contain "host1" are deleted. For a visa containing the wildcard host ALL to be deleted, both hosts must be specified; when "host2" is omitted, "host1" cannot be ALL.
-l To list all visas in the Tunnel System: tunnel_visa -l SEE ALSO tunnel_defaults, tunnel_access, create_visa, delete_visa
BUGS
Please report any bugs to Annette DeSchon <deschon@isi.edu>.
